I study information gathering for rent-seeking purposes in contracting. In my model, an agent learns his payo type only after accepting a contract, but can at costs acquire imperfect information while deliberating whether to accept.
Introduction
This paper oers a new perspective on information gathering for rent-seeking purposes in contracting. Consider the following procurement relationship. A principal seeks to buy parts, which an agent can produce. The agent's production costs are at rst unknown to both parties. After accepting a contract, the agent privately learns the exact state when he makes the necessary preparations for production. In particular, he learns his costs early enough so that the output level could still be adjusted, if the contract allows this. While deliberating whether to accept, he can acquire preliminary information, but at an extra expense.
The acquisition of such precontractual information would be a rent-seeking activity: From a social perspective, the information is redundant, and its acquisition thus wasteful, given that uncertainty resolves in any case before production. To the agent, on the other hand, the information may be valuable, because it would allow him to forecast more precisely whether or not the oered contract would be protable for himself. A similar situation prevails with the sale of experience goods. Here, the consumers may be able to gather information about their valuation before making the purchase decision, which has little social value if the sellers can take back and resell the good.
How does the possibility for such rent seeking aect contract design? Specically, to what distortions does it lead? That is the question that I address in this paper.
In a seminal paper, Crémer and Khalil (1992) (hereafter`CK') demonstrate that if precontractual information would already remove all uncertainty, the principal will design the contract such that the agent accepts without acquiring information. I consider the case of imperfect information. I show that, there, the principal deters the acquisition if and only if the agent's investigation costs exceed some cuto. A key insight is that the case of imperfect information is an instance of a sequential-screening problem.
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The result, and the importance of the imperfection of precontractual information, can be explained as follows. Ex post, the agent will earn a rent, given that he will learn his payo type (i.e., in the above procurement setting, his production costs) privately. Since he will learn the type only after the signing of the contract, the principal can try to extract the expected rent with a participation fee. But now, by acquiring information, the agent has the costly option to examine whether his actual rent is likely to be larger than the fee, and to sign the contract only then. Unless such rent seeking is prohibitively costly, the principal must make a trade-o between eciency and surplus extraction.
The crucial step is to recognize that precontractual information is relevant for the agent's expectation of his rent, and thus his willingness to pay participation fees. If the acquisition entails low costs, so that the contract must anyway be designed almost as if the agent had the information, it is therefore better to make the terms of trade contingent on the informationand thus to induce the acquisition. In particular, if the agent does acquire information, the principal can implement a more ecient contract menu with a larger participation fee conditional on the agent receiving good news about his payo type, and a less ecient menu with a smaller fee in case of bad news. The corresponding contract screens the agent sequentially, so as to elicit not just the payo type but also the posterior belief thereof upon information acquisition.
Of course, precontractual information would be relevant for the agent's expectation of his rent also if the information was perfect, as in CK's analysis. But in that case, the information would be identical to the one that the agent obtains after signing, when he nally learns his payo type. Hence, a contract that deters the acquisition could nevertheless condition on the information. This explains why my result diers from the one by CK. The paper thus identies a possible form of ineciency in contracting: before the unknown state after the signing of the contract fully. The crucial property of CK's model is that precontractual information is identical to the postcontractual information, whereas I assume that it is a garbling.
signing of the contract, parties possibly waste resources to acquire information about parameters that, after signing, they learn anyway. Even though this act is inecient, the social surplus may be larger if the acquisition does take place. Specically, in my model, the principal's best contracts that induce information acquisition implement dierent, possibly more ecient terms of trade than the best contracts that deter information acquisition. The exact welfare properties of these contracts highly depend on the details of the model.
The analysis suggests implications for the use of trial subscriptions as a marketing device, for example by newspapers. A trial subscription allows consumers to learn about their valuation before deciding whether to buy a regular subscription. Eectively, such a test has little social value if subscription plans can be canceled at short notice. But in case that the consumers can easily obtain precontractual information anyway, then, according to this paper, a supplier may nd it optimal to induce information gatheringfor which free trial subscriptions are an eective means.
A key insight is that the contracting problem is closely related to the ones considered in the sequential-screening literature (e.g., Courty and Li 2000; Esö and Szentes 2007; Krähmer and Strausz 2015) . There, agents gradually receive private information over time before the allocation takes place.
2 In the seminal paper by Courty and Li (2000) , in particular, the agent exogenously has imperfect information from the outset and learns his exact payo type after the signing of the contract. That setting is equivalent to the special case of my model in which information acquisition entails zero costs.
3 For this case, the question of whether optimal contracts 2 Another closely related literature considers settings with dynamic adverse selection and multiple allocations (see, e.g., Battaglini 2005 and Boleslavsky and Said 2013) . Occasionally, I refer to both strands as the dynamic contracting literature. See Pavan et al. (2014) for a unied framework. 3 In Courty and Li's model, the agent receives precontractual information already before the contract is oered, rather than only before the signing decision. This dierence is irrelevant: in either case, the agent begins to act with the signing decision. A technical dierence is that Courty and Li assume a continuum of types whereas I, to facilitate the comparison with CK, assume a nite number.
induce information acquisition can be rephrased as whether they condition on the informationand thus indeed screen the agent sequentially. Courty and Li provide a complete characterization of optimal contracts, using regularity assumptions concerning the probability distributions of their model. Under these assumptions, the optimal contracts do screen sequentially. I focus on the optimality of sequential screening and verify this property assuming just a rst-order stochastic dominance ordering of the posterior distributions. The optimality of sequential screening is also studied by Krähmer and Strausz (2015) . They show that if the agent has the right to withdraw from the contract when he learns his payo type, optimal contracts are static, and only condition on the payo type.
With nonzero investigation costs, the contracting problem diers from the one in Courty and Li (2000) by a moral hazard issue. Specically, to induce information acquisition the principal may have to provide extra incentives; contracts that do not condition on the information, on the other hand, need not be designed as if the agent had it. The polar case, endogenous postcontractual information, is studied by Krähmer and Strausz (2011) . There, the agent's incentives to acquire information dier, since he cannot quit the contract afterwards.
Various papers analyze prot-maximizing contracts for related settings in which an agent can acquire information before signing (see Bergemann and Välimäki 2002 for surplus-maximizing mechanisms in a general mechanism-design framework with endogenous information). In particular, Crémer et al. (1998a) , Lewis and Sappington (1997), and Szalay (2009) assume that the agent never learns his payo type for free (see Shi 2012 for an auction setting). Crémer and Khalil (1994) as well as Crémer et al. (1998b) , on the other hand, consider the case that information gathering must take place already before the contract is oered, and thus cannot be induced or deterred by contract design. Finally, Compte and Jehiel (2008) demonstrate that if, in CK's setting, several agents compete for a single, bilateral contract, the principal possibly induces information gathering to nd a suitable candidate.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Sections 3 and 4 describe the ecient outcome and briey review CK's result, respectively.
In Section 5, I rst establish the main result, according to which optimal contracts may induce information gathering. Afterwards, I study optimal contracts in more detail and analyze the comparative static. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Model I use a variant of the procurement model by CK. Specically, a principal seeks to purchase some quantity of a good, which an agent can produce. Given output q ≥ 0, marginal production costs β, and transfer t ∈ R, the agent's payo is t − βq. The principal's payo is V (q) − t, where V is strictly concave, continuously dierentiable, and satises lim q→0 V (q) = ∞ and lim q→∞ V (q) = 0.
Initially, both parties do not know the agent's marginal costs. The common prior is that β equals β i with probabilityγ(β i ) > 0, where i ∈ I := {1, . . . , n}. Suppose 1 < n < ∞, and let 0 < β 1 < · · · < β n < ∞. The agent learns the true value of β before production takes place, but only after the date at which he must decide whether to accept the contract.
At investigation costs e ≥ 0, the agent can acquire a signal s of β while deliberating whether to accept. The signal equals s j with unconditional probability π j > 0, where j ∈ J := {1, . . . , m}. Signal realization s j gives rise to the posterior probability γ j (β i ) of β i . Suppose 1 < m < ∞, and let the possible posteriors be ordered in terms of strict rst-order stochastic dominance: for every i < n, the cumulative posterior probability that β i obtains,
strictly decreases in j. A low signal s thus indicates low costs β.
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A contract stipulates the terms of trade (t, q), possibly contingent on communication. The principal cannot observe whether the agent acquires the signal. Moreover, she cannot verify any reports that the agent might submit about his private information. To distinguish the two possible pieces of private information, I refer to j ∈ J as the agent's posterior type and to i ∈ I as his cost type. Finally, I refer to the signal s as (precontractual ) information.
In detail, the timing of the interaction is as follows:
1. Principal oers contract 2. Agent can acquire information 3. Agent must accept or reject contract 4. If contract accepted: agent learns cost type before production takes place If contract rejected: interaction ends with zero payos Importantly, precontractual information is imperfect. Specically, let γ j (β i ) > 0 for all i, j, so that the agent always still deems each cost type possible upon acquiring information. This is the crucial dierence to the model by CK: there, s equals β, so that precontractual information reveals the cost type perfectly.
3 Eciency
From an eciency perspective, the contract should maximize the expected surplus of the interaction, that is, the expected dierence between V (q) − βq and the incurred investigation costs, if any.
6 The ecient output level depends on the agent's production costs and equalsq(β i ) := V −1 (β i ). Clearly, precontractual information is redundant, and its acquisition thus socially inecient, given that the agent learns his costs anywayperfectly, for free, and before production takes place. I denote the 5 The only other dierence between the two models is that (as a consequence) the posteriors are ordered in terms of weak rather than strict rst-order stochastic dominance in CK's model. My results would also hold with a weak ordering, but some derivations would be longer.
6 Unless stated dierently, I always mean the expectation based on the prior. maximum expected surplus bŷ
Note that if information acquisition was impossible, the principal could implement the ecient output level and fully extract all gains from trade, as the agent learns his production costs only after the signing of the contract.
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4 Benchmark: the case of perfect information
From now on, I study the contracting problem from the perspective of the principal, who wants to maximize her expected payo. I focus on the question of whether optimal contracts induce or deter information acquisition. As a benchmark, I rst review the result by CK. They show that if the information is perfect, it cannot be advantageous to induce the acquisition (see their Lemma 1).
The key insight is that, with perfect information, to each contract that induces information acquisition there corresponds a contract that does not and that implements the same terms of trade. To see this, consider a contract that induces information acquisition. Modify it by allowing the agent to exit once he learns his production costs exogenously, and by postponing any further choice until after that date. If precontractual information is perfect, the agent has then the same information as under the original contract when he decides (ultimately) about his participation and makes any further choice. By revealed preferences, the modied contract therefore implements the same terms of trade as the original one. But the agent has clearly no incentive to acquire information. This argument implies that for each contract that induces information acquisition, there exists a contract that does not and that gives the principal the same expected payo. CK go further and show that unless the investigation costs are zero, the principal can in fact do strictly better with contracts 7 E.g., this could be achieved with a`sell-the-rm' contract, which lets the agent choose output and species the transfert(q) = V (q) −Ŵ .
that deter information acquisition.
If precontractual information is perfect, it is identical to the information that the agent obtains after signing. Therefore, a contract that deters the acquisition can nevertheless condition on the information. With imperfect information, this is clearly not the case: there, the agent must indeed conduct the acquisition if the terms of trade are to depend on precontractual information.
5 The case of imperfect information I now return to the original setting, where precontractual information is imperfect, and show that the principal may there prefer to induce information acquisition.
Contracts that deter information acquisition
Invoking the revelation principle for dynamic games (see Myerson 1986) , I restrict attention to direct, incentive-compatible contracts. The contracts that deter information acquisition have the form
Once the agent learns his cost type, he must announce it with a report k ∈ I. Given the report, the terms of trade are (t(β k ),q(β k )). The contract is incentive-compatible if and only if the agents nds it best to dispense with information acquisition and to report the cost type truthfully.
In detail, the contract must satisfy the following conditions. First (moving backwards), the agent must report the cost type truthfully. Using for the agent's payo the notationŪ
Second, the agent must accept the contract. Since he does not yet know the cost type when the participation decision is due, this condition only requires that the contract guarantees him a nonnegative payo in expectation, rather than for each particular type. Importantly, the expectation derives from the prior, as the agent is supposed to dispense with information gathering:
Finally, the agent must indeed not gather information. Precontractual information is valuable to him if and only if, with some posterior types, the contract yields a negative expected payo: if he could update his expectation, he would be able to avoid a likely loss by rejecting the contract oer. The value of information must be smaller than the investigation costs:
Consider now the principal's objective. She seeks to maximize her expected payo.
Thus, the best contracts that deter information acquisition are the solutions tō P : max
(1)(3).
Contracts that induce information acquisition
The contracts that induce information acquisition have the form
First, the agent must submit a report l ∈ J about the posterior type. Later on, when he learns his production costs, he must submit a second report, k ∈ I, this time about the cost type. The two reports lead to the terms of trade (t l (β k ), q l (β k )). A contract (t, q) is incentive-compatible if and only if the agent prefers to gather information and to submit two truthful reports.
Since the agent obtains two pieces of private informationrst the posterior type, later on the cost typehe must also report twice, and is thus screened sequentially.
Note that if precontractual information was perfect rather than imperfect, so that posterior and cost type were equivalent, there would be no reason to let the agent report twice. Indeed, the revelation principle would then demand just one report (to be submitted before the agent learns his costs exogenously).
In detail, the contract must satisfy the following conditions. First, the agent must again report the cost type truthfully. Using for the agent's payo the notation
this condition reads:
Second, the agent must also report the posterior type truthfully:
Third, the agent must participate. In contrast to the contracts (t,q), this condition requires that the contract is acceptable conditional on the posterior type, rather than the prior, because the agent is supposed to gather information:
Finally, the agent must indeed gather information. Precontractual information can be valuable to him because it allows to report the posterior type truthfully.
8 The following condition ensures that the value of information is larger than the investigation costs:
8 Without (6), the individual-rationality condition, the information could be valuable also with respect to the participation decision. Precisely, it would be valuable if and only if the contract was acceptable with some, but not all posterior types. Requiring individual rationality is as usual without loss of generality: given any incentive-compatible contract (t , q ) that is acceptable only with posterior types j ∈ J ⊂ J, the contract (t , q ) with
and implements the same terms of trade.
The best contracts that induce information acquisition are thus the solutions to P : max
The principal's optimal contracts, nally, can be found as follows: First, derive the best contracts that deter and induce information acquisition, respectively. 9 Second, maximize over this binary choice.
5.3
Information gathering for rent-seeking purposes I now show that unless information gathering is prohibitively costly, the principal must make a trade-o between eciency and surplus extraction to design an optimal contract. So suppose she chooses to deter the acquisition of the socially useless information. The following lemma simplies the relevant conditions. Lemma 1. Among the contracts (t,q), for each contract that satises (1)(3) there is a contract with identical expected payos for both parties that satises
together withŪ
Moreover, (8)(11) imply (1)(3).
According to (11), the agent earns an extra payo for not exaggerating his production costs. By (8), on the other hand, reporting lower costs obliges to produce more output. These two, standard conditions make sure that the agent reports his cost type truthfully.
(9) is the participation condition. Note that by (11), the agent's payo with cost
I refer to the summand on the right-hand side as the agent's rent with cost type i, and to −Ū (β n ) as a participation fee. The agent nds the contract acceptable if and only if, conditional on the prior, the participation fee does not exceed the expected rent.
(10), nally, guarantees that the agent does not gather information. Precontractual information is valuable to the agent if and only if the participation fee exceeds the expected rent conditional on some posterior types. To understand the condition, note that the rent is larger the lower the cost type. By the rst-order stochastic dominance ordering of the posteriors, the expected rent is thus larger the lower the posterior type. This implies that if the participation fee exceeds the expected rent with some posterior type l, then so it does for all types j > l.
Condition (11) can be inserted directly into the principal's objective function, which I now write as the dierence between expected surplus and expected payo to
Note that by (11), the transfers are pinned down by the output schedule up to the participation fee. I may therefore regard contracts that deter information acquisition alternatively as combinations (−Ū (β n ),q) of participation fee and output schedule.
The best contract, denoted by (−Ū * (β n ),q * ), is the unique solution tō P : max
s.t. (8)(10).
I can now show that the agent's possibility to gather information for rent-seeking purposes may force the principal to make a trade-o between eciency and surplus extraction. Suppose information acquisition was impossible. In that case, condition (10) could be ignored. Clearly, the principal would implement the ecient output schedule,q =q, and fully extract all gains from trade with a participation fee equal to the agent's expected rent,
The main result of this section is that this contract may violate condition (10): Proposition 1. There exists a cuto level of investigation costsê > 0 such that (−Û (β n ),q) satises (10) if and only if e ≥ê.
Since the participation fee −Û (β n ) equals the expected rent conditional on the prior, it must exceed it conditional on some posterior types. Hence, precontractual information is valuable to the agent. The described contract satises (10), the noinformation-acquisition condition, thus only for high investigation costs.
By acquiring information, the agent has the costly option to check his payo from the contract before deciding whether to accept it. Proposition 1 says that unless this rent-seeking activity is prohibitively costly, the principal must make a tradeo between eciency and surplus extraction to nd an optimal contract. I now demonstrate that it can then be advantageous to make the terms of trade contingent on the informationand thus to induce the acquisition.
Use of contracts that induce information acquisition
This section presents the main result of the paper, according to which the principal may prefer to induce information acquisition. In the remaining analysis, I denote bȳ W (e) and W (e) the principal's expected payo from the best contracts that deter and induce information acquisition, respectively, depending on the investigation costs.
My derivation will not involve a full characterization of these best contracts. In particular, I will not provide an analog of Lemma 1 and simplify the conditions that the contracts that induce information acquisition must satisfy. This is because, as is well known in the literature on dynamic contracting with exogenous information, truthtelling conditions for sequential-screening contracts generally lack useful characterizations (see, e.g., Pavan et al. 2014) . The usual approach is to make stringent regularity assumptions that allow to focus on a relaxed problem (see Battaglini and Lamba 2015 for details and a discussion). Specically, the assumptions would concern the probability distributions of the model, and thus the quality of precontractual information. I omit them because my result holds generally with imperfect information. In fact, in the present setting, a characterization of the best sequential-screening contracts (t, q) would entail additional complications, given that precontractual information is endogenous.
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I start with a partial comparison.
Lemma 2. The functionsW and W have the following properties:
1.W is nondecreasing and W nonincreasing; 2. they are continuous; 3. they have a unique intersection.
The rst and the last statement are intuitive: Contracts that induce information acquisition have two disadvantages. First, they must satisfy a more restrictive participation condition. Specically, they must be protable for the agent conditional on the posterior type, whereas a contract that deters the acquisition only needs to be protable conditional on the prior, as long as the value of information does not exceed the investigation costs. The second disadvantage is that information acquisition must be incentive-compatible, to compensate the agent for the investigation costs.
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Now, these disadvantages are less substantial the lower the investigation costs. In 10 Section 5.5 gives a characterization for the special case of binary posterior and cost types.
11 Hence, W (e) ≤Ŵ − e for all e, whereas by Proposition 1W (e) =Ŵ for e ≥ê.
particular, if e = 0, the agent eectively has precontractual information anyway. In fact, in that case, the only dierence between the contracts (t,q) and (t, q) is that the latter ones allow to make the terms of trade contingent on the information.
The key step is now to recognize that if information acquisition entails zero costs, so that the contract must anyway be designed as if the agent had the information, it is strictly optimal to make the terms of trade contingent:
Remark 1. If information acquisition entails zero costs, the contracting problem is in fact equivalent to the one considered in the seminal paper on sequential screening by Courty and Li (2000) , where the agent exogenously has imperfect information from the outset. Courty and Li provide a complete characterization of optimal contracts, using regularity assumptions. Under these assumptions, the optimal contracts in their model also condition on the information.
In the following, I give a detailed illustration of the lemma for the case of binary posterior and cost types (m = n = 2). I refer to j = 1, 2 as the optimistic and the pessimistic posterior type, respectively, and write j = O, P . Consider rst the contracts that deter information acquisition. As in the previous section, I regard them as combinations (−Ū (β 2 ),q) of participation fee and output schedule. The agent earns a rent of (β 2 − β 1 )q(β 2 ) if he has low production costs, and no rent in case of high costs. Conditional on posterior type j, his expected payo is thus
Now, since information gathering entails zero costs, the contract must be acceptable for each posterior type. With the optimistic type, however, the agent is more condent to earn the rent: γ O (β 1 ) > γ P (β 1 ). Hence, the principal cannot extract the expected rent fullyan illustration of Proposition 1. As a consequence, the best contract that deters information acquisition stipulates an ineciently low output level q(β 2 ).
The key insight is that the terms of trade should never be distorted for both posterior types in this fashion. With the optimistic type, the agent has a larger valuation for rent, given that he is more condent to earn it. Hence, ifwith the optimistic typehe was to produce eciently and pay an extra participation fee that fully extracts the extra expected rent, whereaswith the pessimistic typehe was to stick with the original contract, he would comply.
In detail, suppose the agent can choose among the best contract that deters information acquisition, (−Ū * (β 2 ),q * ), and a contract (−Ū (β 2 ),q ) which only diers in thatq (β 2 ) =q(β 2 ) and
Under the alternative contract, the agent thus produces eciently, and hence earns an extra rent. However, he must also pay an extra participation fee, which equals the extra expected rent conditional on the optimistic posterior type. With that type, he would consequently be indierent, and thus willing to choose the alternative contract:
With the pessimistic type, in contrast, the agent would stick with the original contract, given that he is less condent to earn the extra rent:
the original model, where the numbers of posterior and cost types are arbitrary, and
shows that the principal can strictly improve over the best contract that deters information acquisition with a contract (t, q) that exhibits`no distortion at the top', that is, which implements the ecient output schedule if the agent has the posterior type j = 1.
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Thus, if information gathering entails zero costs, so that the contract must anyway be designed as if the agent had the information, it is strictly optimal to make the terms of trade contingent because the information determines the agent's expectation of the rent that he will earn, and hence his willingness to pay participation fees.
Lemmas 2 and 3 directly imply the main result of the paper. Of course, it would be best if the agent could not obtain precontractual information at all. But given that he has this possibility, it can be advantageous not to deter the acquisition: Theorem 1. There exists a cuto level of investigation costsē > 0 such that
• if e <ē, optimal contracts induce information acquisition (W (e) >W (e));
• if e >ē, optimal contracts deter information acquisition (W (e) <W (e)).
Characterizations and comparisons
To study the optimal contracts in more detail, I restrict attention from now on to the case of binary posterior and cost types. The present section fully characterizes and compares the best contracts that deter and induce information acquisition, respectively. In the following, I use the notation
12 The reasoning is reminiscent of Battaglini (2005) . In a setting with multiple allocations, dynamic adverse selection, and binary states, he shows that once the agent reports for the rst time to be in the`good' state, all subsequent allocations are ecient (his`generalized no-distortion-at-thetop principle'). The reasoning might suggest that given e = 0, optimal contracts generally implement more ecient output levels the lower the posterior type. Results from the dynamic-contracting literature show that this is not the case: distortions in optimal contracts highly depend on the details of the model (see in particular Battaglini and Lamba 2015) .
Consider rst the contracts that deter information acquisition. They are studied in detail by CK, whose results easily extend to imperfect information. For the characterization, let
Proposition 2. The best contract that deters information acquisition is given as follows:
• if e ≥ê, then (−Ū * (β 2 ),q * ) = (−Û (β 2 ),q).
Proposition 1 already established that if the investigation costs are high enough (e ≥ê), the principal can implement the ecient output schedule and fully extract the agent's expected rent. For lower investigation costs, this is not feasible, as the agent would gather information before deciding whether to accept. Specically, (10), the no-information-acquisition condition, binds. The principal can then only extract the expected rent conditional on the pessimistic posterior type, plus a markup proportional to the investigation costs. As the surplus that she can not extract depends on the output levelq(β 2 ), she chooses this output level ineciently low. Specically, for e < e A she chooses the same level that would be optimal if the agent knew his posterior type. For e ∈ (e A ,ê), the participation condition binds as well, andq(β 2 )
increases with e to the ecient level.
Consider now the contracts that induce information acquisition. Analogously to Lemma 1, I rst simplify the relevant conditions. Lemma 4. Among the contracts (t, q), for each contract that satises (4)(7) there is a contract with identical expected payos for both parties that satises
U P (β 2 ) + γ P (β 1 )(β 2 − β 1 )q P (β 2 ) ≥ 0
together with
Moreover, (12)(17) imply (4)(7). (12), (15), and (16) together ensure that the agent reports his production costs truthfully. As with the contracts that deter information acquisition, this requires that the agent earns a rent in case that the production costs are low. The agent's expected payo thus again equals the dierence between expected rent and participation fee.
However, both rent and fee now depend on the posterior type.
(13) is the participation condition. By incentive-compatibility, it suces that the agent nds the contract protable if he has the pessimistic posterior type, with which he is less condent to earn rent. (14) and (17) Conditions (15)(17) can be inserted directly into the objective function, which I now write as the dierence between expected surplus and expected payo to the agent:
Note that by (15)(17), the transfers are pinned down by the output schedules up to the participation fee for the pessimistic posterior type. I may therefore regard contracts that induce information acquisition alternatively as combinations (−U P (β 2 ), q) of this participation fee and the menu of output schedules. The best contract, denoted by (−U * P (β 2 ), q * ), is the unique solution to P : max
. (12)(14).
The best contract is characterized in Proposition 3 below. To state the result, let
and let
Proposition 3. The best contract that induces information acquisition is given as follows:
The principal chooses the participation fee −U P (β 2 ) as large as possible, and thus equal to the expected rent conditional on the pessimistic posterior type. As described above, she can furthermore appropriate the extra expected rent that the optimistic type earns with his terms of trade. The surplus that the principal can not extract depends consequently only on the terms of trade for the pessimistic type, precisely, on the output level q P (β 2 ). Now, if the investigation costs are low, the principal need not distort the contract in order to induce information acquisition. Therefore, she stipulates q P (β 2 ) ineciently low and otherwise requires ecient production. For high e, on the other hand, the information-acquisition condition (14) binds. The principal then raises q O (β 1 ) above the ecient level and further reduces q P (β 2 ), to implement the extra output that (14) requires.
Observe that even though information acquisition is inecient, the best contract that induces information acquisition may result in a larger expected surplus than the best contract that deters this act. This is because it implements dierent, possibly more ecient output levels. For illustration, suppose the investigation costs are zero:
in that case, the potential welfare gain must be maximal. The dierence in expected surplus between the two contracts equals then
The rst line is positive: With contracts that induce information acquisition, the principal can fully extract any extra expected rent that the optimistic posterior type earns with his terms of trade, and therefore she sets q O (β 2 ) to the ecient level. With contracts that deter information acquisition, in contrast, she choosesq(β 2 ) ineciently low. The second line is negative: With contracts that induce information acquisition, the surplus that the principal cannot extract depends on the output level q P (β 2 ), whereas with contracts that deter information acquisition, it depends onq(β 2 ). As q P (β 2 ) only applies to the pessimistic posterior type, the principal distorts it even more thanq(β 2 ). One can easily verify that the overall expression is strictly positive if, for example, the optimistic posterior type has a suciently high probability (i.e., if π O is large).
Comparative static
According to the present paper, the principal may induce information acquisition if the information is imperfect. CK, on the other hand, demonstrate that the acquisition of perfect information will be deterred. In view of this contrast, I now study the comparative static when the information becomes more precise.
Let I := (π j ) j , ((γ j (β i )) i,j be an information structure. I dene increased precision in terms of Blackwell suciency (see Blackwell and Girshick 1954, Ch. 12.5 ).
Specically, given two information structures I , I , I say that precontractual information is more precise under I than under I if and only if
and, for both cost types i = 1, 2,
With more precise information, the posterior probabilities of the two cost types are thus more extreme, whereas the prior probabilities remain unchanged.
I study the eect of increased precision on W (e) −W (e), the payo dierence between the best contracts that induce and deter information acquisition, respectively.
The following proposition says that in the limit, when precontractual information becomes arbitrarily precise (i.e., perfect), CK's result obtains, according to which it cannot be advantageous to induce information acquisition.
Proposition 4. Let (I τ ) τ ≥0 be a sequence of information structures such that if τ > τ , precontractual information is more precise under I τ than under I τ , and
The proposition follows from the insights of the previous section. With contracts that deter information acquisition, the surplus that the principal cannot extract depends on the output levelq(β 2 ), which applies to both posterior types. With contracts that induce information acquisition, in contrast, it depends on q P (β 2 ), which only applies to the pessimistic type. In the limit, this dierence is irrelevant, as γ O (β 2 ) → 0.
More generally, when precontractual information becomes arbitrarily precise, it becomes identical to the information that the agent obtains after signing. Contracts that deter information acquisition can therefore implement the same terms of trade as contracts that induce information acquisition.
Apart from the limit, contracts that induce information acquisition may become more advantageous with more precise information. For illustration, suppose the investigation costs are below the cutos e A and e C from Propositions 2 and 3. Then,
If precontractual information gets more precise, the principal has to leave more surplus to the agent per unitq(β 2 ) and q P (β 2 ), respectively, as the term
increases. This is intuitive: if precontractual information was not availableor pure noisethe principal could fully extract all gains from trade. Now, as explained above, the optimal output level q P (β 2 ) is smaller than the optimalq(β 2 ), since it applies only to the pessimistic posterior type. The following example shows that W (e)−W (e) may therefore locally increase in the precision, and even change sign. Note that the cuto e in Theorem 1, at which the principal switches from a contract that induces to one that deters information acquisition, may thus also locally increase in the precision.
Example 1. For V (q) = 100 √ q, β 1 = 1, β 2 = 2, and e = 2, let I be characterized by
Then, precontractual information is more precise under I than under I , but W (e)− W (e) ≈ −3 whereas W (e) −W (e) ≈ 2.
Conclusion
This paper oers a new perspective on information gathering for rent-seeking purposes in contracting. Of course, it is best for a principal if the agent obtains all private information only after accepting a contract. But if the agent can acquire information in advance, while deliberating whether to accept, the principal may not deter the acquisition. A key insight is that situations with pre-and postcontractual private information are generally instances of sequential-screening problems.
In this paper, the agent learns his payo type after the signing of the contract exogenously. In many situations, a principal can disclose some source of private information to an agent. The recent literature on disclosure rules in optimal auctions, for example, considers auction settings in which an auctioneer can disclose, without observing, information to bidders that is relevant for their valuations (see, e.g., Bergemann and Pesendorfer 2007; Esö and Szentes 2007; Li and Shi 2015) . In such situations, an agent's possibility to gather information for rent-seeking purposes might aect both the design of the contract and the disclosure rule. This could be a topic for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
By standard arguments (see, e.g., Laont and Martimort 2002, Ch. 3.1) , (1) is equivalent toŪ 
Hence, (A.2) does not hold. Suppose next that (A.1), (8), and (2) hold but (A.2) not. Let l ∈ {2, . . . , m} be the smallest posterior type such that i γ j (β i )Ū (β i ) < 0.
Hence, condition (3) does not hold.
Next, I show that (A.1) can without loss of generality be replaced by the stronger condition (11), and consequently (2) by (9) and (A.2) by (10). This will conclude the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma A2. Among the contracts (t,q), for each contract that satises (A.1), (8), (2), and (A.2) there is a contract with identical expected payos for both parties that satises (8)(11).
Proof. Let (t ,q ) be any contract that satises (A.1), (8), (2), and (A.2). For a given cost type k < n, dene
Consider the alternative contract (t ,q ), which diers from (t ,q ) only with respect to transfers, namely such that
Given these transfers, the alternative contract satises
and the other payo dierences are as under the original contract,
so the alternative contract results in identical expected payos for both parties as the original one. Note that this implies that the alternative contract satises condition (2). Finally, for every posterior type l ∈ {2, . . . , m} it holds that
where the rst inequality follows from the rst-order stochastic dominance ordering of the posteriors and the second one from the hypothesis that the original contract satises (A.2). Thus, the alternative contract also satises (A.2).
Repeating the argument for each k < n establishes Lemma A2.
Proof of Proposition 1
The rst-order stochastic dominance ordering of the posteriors implies that
strictly decreases in j. Hence, there are posterior types l ∈ {2, . . . , m} witĥ
Let l * be the smallest such l. Then, (10) holds if and only if
Proof of Lemma 2
Formally,W and W are the value functions of the optimization problemsP (orP ) and P, respectively, for the parameter e ≥ 0. That these functions are nondecreasing and nonincreasing, respectively, follows from the fact that if e increases, the choice sets inP and P become larger and smaller, respectively, whereas the objective functions do not vary with e. To prove that these functions have a unique intersection, I rst show that intersections exist. At e = 0, to every contract (t,q) that satises (1)(3) there corresponds a contract (t, q) that satises (4) (7) with where κ j , j = 2, . . . , m, are nonnegative Lagrange multipliers associated to condition (10). Again by Proposition 1, for e ∈ [0,ê) at least one multiplier is strictly positive.
Being continuous,W must hence be strictly increasing on [0,ê). This implies that there is just one intersection, given that W is nonincreasing.
Proof of Lemma 3
Consider rst the contracts that deter information acquisition. The following lemma says that the best contractthe solution (−U * (β n ),q * ) toP exhibits downward distortions for all cost types except the lowest one.
Lemma A3. If e = 0, thenq * (β i ) <q(β i ) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , m} andq * (β 1 ) =q(β 1 ).
Proof. If e = 0, then, by the rst-order stochastic dominance ordering of the posteriors, (10) holds if and only if
Clearly, this condition implies (9) and holds with equality at the optimum.P can thus be restated as
Let µ(β i ), i < n, be nonnegative Lagrange multipliers associated to (8). Then,
For all cost types i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1},
It follows thatq * (β n ) <q(β n ). For i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, supposeq
Turn now to the contracts that induce information acquisition. I rst replace (4)(7) by sucient alternative conditions. Afterwards, I construct a contract that satises these conditions and improves over the best contract that deters information acquisition.
By standard arguments, (4) is equivalent to the monotonicity condition
I replace (4) by (A.3) and
The truthtelling condition (5) then reads .5) and the participation condition, (6),
The information-acquisition condition, (7), is implied by (5) and (6) at e = 0.
Note that by (A.4), the transfers are for each posterior type j pinned down by that type's output schedule up to the constant −U j (β n ). I therefore regard contracts that induce information acquisition in this proof as combinations (−U 1 (β n ), . . . , −U m (β n ), q), the relevant conditions being (A.3), (A.5), and (A.6).
Consider the contract (−U 1 (β n ), . . . , −U m (β n ), q ), designed as follows. For all posterior types j ∈ {2, . . . , m},
that is, the agent produces according to the same output schedule as under the best contract that deters information acquisition, (−Ū * (β n ),q * ), and also gets the same expected payo. For posterior type j = 1, on the other hand,
that is, the agent again gets the same expected payo as with (−Ū * (β n ),q * ), but produces eciently.
Clearly, this contract satises (A.3). To check (A.5), note that for j = 1 the agent is indierent, and thus willing to report truthfully. For all j ∈ {2, . . . , m}, there is no incentive to deviate either:
where the inequality follows from the rst-order stochastic dominance ordering of the posteriors and Lemma A3. Finally, (A.6) holds by (A.5) and the fact that
By Lemma A3, (−U 1 (β n ), . . . , −U m (β n ), q ) generates a strictly larger expected surplus than the best contract that deters information acquisition, (−Ū * (β n ),q * ). On the other hand, it provides the agent with the same expected payo. This observation establishes W (0) >W (0) and thus concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1
Follows directly from Lemmas 2 and 3.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 1 already established the last bullet point. For the rst bullet point, rst ignore constraint (9). Then, (10) holds with equality at the optimum, and the best contract is (−Ū A (β 2 ),q(β 1 ),q A (β 2 )). This contract actually satises (9) if and only if e ≤ e A . For the second bullet point, I rst show that both (9) and (10) hold with equality at the optimum on (e A ,ê). Suppose both hold with (strict) inequality. Then, the objective could be increased by slightly increasing −Ū (β 2 ). Suppose (9) holds with equality but (10) with inequality. Then, e > φq(β 2 ). Hence, by the denition ofê,q(β 2 ) <q(β 2 ), and the objective could be increased by slightly increasingq(β 2 ) and −Ū (β 2 ) such that (9) still holds with equality. Finally, suppose (10) holds with equality but (9) with inequality. Then, e < φq(β 2 ). Hence, by the denition of e A , q(β 2 ) >q A (β 2 ), and the objective could be increased by slightly reducingq(β 2 ) and −Ū (β 2 ) such that (10) still holds with equality. Thus, both (9) and (10) hold with equality. Solving for −Ū (β 2 ) andq(β 2 ) yields −Ū B (β 2 ) andq B (β 2 ).
Proof of Lemma 4
By standard arguments, (4) is equivalent to U j (β 1 ) − U j (β 2 ) ∈ [(β 2 − β 1 )q j (β 2 ), (β 2 − β 1 )q j (β 1 )] ∀j = O, P (A.7) together with the monotonicity condition (12). Given (A.7) and (5), the rst-order stochastic dominance ordering of the posteriors (γ O (β 1 ) > γ P (β 1 )) implies that (6) holds if and only if U P (β 1 ) + γ P (β 1 ) [U P (β 1 ) − U P (β 2 )] ≥ 0.
(A.8)
Given (A.7), (5), and (A.8), in turn, the dominance ordering implies that in (7) the double sum on the right hand side is nonnegative for l = P , so (7) holds if and only if U j (β 2 ) + γ j (β 1 ) [U j (β 1 ) − U j (β 2 )] − e π j ≥ U l (β 2 ) + γ j (β 1 ) [U l (β 1 ) − U l (β 2 )] ∀j, l = j ∈ {O, P }.
(A.9)
Note that (A.9) implies (5). Thus, (4)(7) hold if and only if (12) and (A.7)(A.9)
hold.
Next, I show that (A.7) can without loss of generality be replaced by the stronger conditions (15) and (16). Let (t , q ) be any contract that satises (12) and P := U P (β 1 ) − U P (β 2 ) − (β 2 − β 1 )q P (β 2 ).
Consider the alternative contract (t , q ), which diers from (t , q ) only with respect to transfers, namely such that parties as the original contract. Note that the alternative contract therefore satises (A.8). As to (A.9), it holds that
where the rst inequality follows from the fact that (t , q ) satises (A.9) and the second one from the rst-order stochastic dominance ordering of the posteriors. An analogous comparison shows that the other inequality in (A.9) is met as well.
Given (15) and (16), condition (A.8) reads (13), and (A.9) is by standard arguments equivalent to
− γ P (β 1 )(β 2 − β 1 ) [q O (β 1 ) − q P (β 2 )] − e π P (A.10) together with the monotonicity condition (14).
To conclude the proof, I show that (A.10) can without loss of generality be replaced by the stronger condition (17). Let (t † , q † ) be any contract that satises (12)(14) as well as (15), (16), and (A.10). Dene
Consider the alternative contract (t ‡ , q ‡ ), which diers from (t † , q † ) only with respect to transfers, namely such that for each cost type i = 1, 2
Given these transfers, the alternative contract satises (17). Moreover, conditional on the prior, it results in identical expected payos for both parties as the original contract. Finally, (13), (15), and (16) clearly hold as well.
Proof of Proposition 3
Concerning q O (β 1 ) and q P (β 2 ), rst ignore constraint (14). Then,q(β 1 ) and q C P (β 2 ) are optimal. This choice actually satises (14) if and only if e ≤ e C . For e > e C , suppose (14) holds with strict inequality at the optimum. Then, at least one of the choice variables q O (β 1 ) and q P (β 2 ) diers fromq(β 1 ) and q C P (β 2 ), respectively, and the objective could be increased by a slight modication of that variable towardsq(β 1 ) and q C P (β 2 ), respectively.
Proof of Proposition 4
The characterizations in Section 5.5 imply that all choice variables of the best contracts converge to nite limits. Thus, W l (e) −W l (e) < 0.
